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STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION: THE FCC PROVIDES

REGULATORY RELIEF IN INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS
AND INTERNATIONAL SERVICES LICENSING

Paul W. Kenefick*

In spring 1999, the Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC" or "Commission") released
two orders affecting its international settlements
policy and its policy of licensing U.S. carriers engaged in international telecommunications services.' Both orders were the result of the FCC International Bureau's ("IB" or "Bureau") 1998
biennial regulatory review, as required under section 11 of the Communications Act. 2 In this re-

view, the International Bureau conducted a public forum and held many informal meetings with
interested members of the telecommunications
community, including the Federal Communications Bar Association, to seek ideas to simplify,
streamline and eliminate burdens on the international telecommunications industry and the Commission. The Commission is required to conduct
a similar review in 2000.
This article will focus on the initiatives and impact of the licensing reform and ISP reform orders on the international telecommunications
community, how these orders affected their respective issue areas and what can be accomplished
in the Year 2000 review. Part I will analyze the biennial review obligation of the Commission,
which was mandated by Congress-among other
regulatory reform initiatives-through Title IV of

the Telecommunications Act of 1996. 3 Part II provides a brief history of the Commission's licensing
of U.S. carriers engaged in the provision of international telecommunications, from the 1995 Market Entry Order' through the implementation of
the World Trade Organization's Basic Telecommunications Agreement. 5 Part II also explores
how the 1999 Licensing Reform Order impacted this
system. Part III will focus on the Commission's international settlements policy, which governs how
U.S. carriers compensate foreign carriers for the
exchange of switched traffic. This section will provide background on how the Commission's settlements policy has regulated the exchange of international traffic and how the ISP Reform Order
impacts this regime. Finally, Part IV focuses on
how the biennial review impacted these regulations and how the Commission could have provided more relief, and provides suggestions for
the next biennial review in 2000.
I.

THE COMMISSION'S BIENNIAL REVIEW
OBLIGATIONS

Title IV of the Telecommunications Act of 1996
focused on regulatory reform of the Communications Act of 1934 and the Commission's rules. 6 In
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Associations. The opinions and conclusions of this article are
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I See In re 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review-Reform of
the International Settlements Policy and Associated Filing

Common Carrier Regulations, Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd.

Requirements, Report and Order and Order on Reconsideration,

WTO Basic Telecom Agreement].

14 FCC Rcd. 7963 (1999) [hereinafter ISP Reform Order]; In re
1998 Biennial Regulatory Review-Review of International

6 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Title IV, Pub. L. No.
104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in scattered sections of 47

4909 (1998) [hereinafter Licensing Reform Order].

See 47 U.S.C. § 161 (1994 & Supp. 11 1996).
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104,
110 Stat. 56 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-714).
4 In Re Market Entry and Regulation of Foreign-affiliated
Entities, Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 3873 (1995) [hereinaf2
3

ter Market Entry Order].
5 See World Trade Organization: Agreement on Telecommunications Services (Fourth Protocol to the General Agreement on Trade in Services) 36 I.L.M. 354 (1997) [hereinafter
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addition to requiring in section 11 that the Commission review its regulations every other year and
instituting several specific amendments to the
Act, 7 Title IV authorizes the Commission to forbear, with limited exceptions, from applying any
regulation or provision of the Act when certain
determinations are made.8 In assessing whether to
forbear, the Commission must determine that
such a rule or section of the Act is not necessary
to effectuate certain goals, that enforcement is
not necessary for the protection of consumers and
that forbearance is consistent with the public interest.9 Section 10 directs the Commission to consider whether forbearance will promote competitive market conditions and enhance
competition.' 0 Interested parties, including telecommunications carriers directly impacted by a
particular rule or provision of the Act, may file a
petition requesting that the Commission exercise
its forbearance authority. 1 The Commission must
act within a year on any petition for forbearance
unless an extension is granted and must explain
its refusal or acceptance of forbearance, in whole
12
or in part, on the record.
Under Title IV of the 1996 Act, the Commission
must review, in every even-numbered year beginning with 1998, all regulations issued under the
Act that apply to the activities of a telecommunications service provider.' 3 The review must determine whether the regulations remain in the public interest after meaningful economic
competition has arisen between providers of such
service. 14 Upon review, the Commission is further
mandated to repeal or modify any regulation it
determines is no longer necessary to serve the
public interest.

15

Unlike section 10, which provides the Commission authority to forbear from applying statutory
provisions if the mandated test under section
U.S.C). "

See 47 U.S.C. § 160(a)(1)-(3) (1994 & Supp. 11 1996).
8 See 47 U.S.C. § 160 (1994 & Supp. 11 1996).
9 See 47 U.S.C. § 160(a).
7

10

See 47 U.S.C. § 160(b).
See 47 U.S.C. § 160(c).
12
See id.
3
See 47 U.S.C. § 161(a)
14 See id.
15
See 47 U.S.C.§ 161(b).
16
Seegenerally47 U.S.C. § 161.
17 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 161 & 162 (1994 & Supp. 11 1996).
18
See 1998 FCC Biennial Review Home Page (visited
Sept. 13, 1999) <www.fcc.gov/biennial>.
19 The other proceedings the FCC's International Bu11
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10(a) is met, section 11 does not provide the
Commission with the authority to repeal or modify any statute or provision of the Act. 16 The biennial review is strictly limited to regulatory initiatives and determinations that are at the discretion
of the Commission, but the authority to forbear
from applying a statutory obligation may be exer7
cised at any time.'
Beginning in January 1998, the Commission initiated a series of rulemaking proceedings as part
of its 1998 Biennial Regulatory review.' Thirtyone different proceedings, in the Common Carrier, Wireless Telecommunications, Mass Media
and International Bureaus, 19 were initiated subsequent to a "broad, comprehensive internal review
of all existing FCC regulations and informal input
from industry and the public." 20 These initiatives
were aimed at eliminating or modifying rules addressing such issues as the bundling of consumer
premises equipment with telecommunications
service, interlocking directorates between telecommunications carriers and the cross ownership
21
restrictions on certain spectrum bands.

II.

INTERNATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
LICENSING

In order to properly appreciate the impact of
the Commission's Licensing Reform Order, it is essential to analyze the obligations and restrictions
placed on U.S. carriers that engage in the provision of international telecommunications service-particularly those that are foreign-owned or
-affiliated. While for a number of years the Commission has employed varying public interest tests
to determine whether an international service license application is in the public interest, 22 The
reau initiated pursuant to Section 11(a) that are not discussed in this article address settlements in the maritime mobile and maritime mobile-satellite radio services. See generally
In re 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review-Review of Accounts
Settlement in the Maritime Mobile and Maritime Mobile-Satellite Radio Services and Withdrawal of the Commission as an
Accounting Authority in the Maritime Mobile and the Maritime Mobile-Satellite Radio Services Except for Distress and
Safety Communications, Report and Order and FurtherNotice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 14 FCC Rcd. 13504 (1999).
21
FCC Staff Proposes 31 Proceedings as Part of 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review (Rpt. No. GN 98-1), FCC News,
Feb. 5, 1998.
21
See id.
22
See, e.g., effective competitive opportunities ("ECO")
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Market Entry Order2 3 is often considered the beginning of a new era and the pinnacle of regulation
in this area. This order, which instituted a rigorous test for foreign carrier entry into the U.S.
market for international telecommunications, initiated the Commission's streamline of the application review process and entry criteria (with the exception of its benchmark settlement rate policy).
This streamlining was ultimately achieved
through the Streamlining Order,24 the implementation of the WTO's Fourth Protocol to the General
Agreement on Trade in Services 25 in the Commission's Foreign ParticipationOrder, 26 and eventually
27
with the biennial review's Licensing Reform Order
A.

Licensing Prior to the Market Entry Order

The Commission is under a statutory obligation
to ensure (1) that the grant of Section 21428 authority is consistent with the public convenience
and necessity29 and (2) that the grant of a section
310(b) (4)30 application, a request to exceed the
twenty-five percent indirect foreign ownership
benchmark in radio licenses, is consistent with the
public interest.
Prior to the Market Entry Order,the Comnission
"evaluated foreign ownership in U.S. telecommunications carriers and radio licenses on an ad hoc
basis. 3 1 For carriers seeking authority to provide
international telecommunications service on a facilities or resale basis, the Commission balanced
its policy in favor of open market entry against the
potential for discrimination against unaffiliated
standard discussed infra.ECO is a two-pronged dejure/defacto
analysis of whether entry serves the public interest, convenience and necessity. See id.
23
11 FCC Rcd. at 3875.
24
In re Streamlining the International Section 214 Authorization Process and Tariff Requirements, Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 12884 (1996) [hereinafter Streamlining Order].
25

See generally WfO Basic Telecom Agreement, supra note 6.

See In re Rules and Policies on Foreign Participation in
the U.S. Telecommunications Market; Market Entry and Regulation of Foreign-Affiliated Entities, Report and Order and Or26

der on Reconsideration, 12 FCC Rcd. 23891 (1997), recon. pending [hereinafter Foreign ParticipationOrder].

14 FCC Rcd. 4909 (1998).
47 U.S.C. § 214 (1994 & Supp. 111996) (providing the
Commission with its general licensing authority).
29
Section 214(a) of the Communications Act states,
No carrier shall undertake the construction of a new line
or of an extension of any line, or shall acquire or operate any line, or extension thereof, or shall engage in
transmission over or by means of such additional or ex27
28

U.S. carriers by the foreign carrier's parent.32

Under section 310(b) (4), the Commission considered several factors for applicants wishing to exceed the twenty-five percent indirect foreign ownership benchmark. 3 3 Some factors include
national security issues, the extent of alien participation, the type of radio license sought and the
extent to which the investment would further the
Commission's policies at the time.3

4

At the time,

no clear entry criteria were available for foreign
carriers to enter the market.
B.

The Market Entry Order

On November 30, 1995, the Commission released its Market Entry Order,which set forth entry
criteria as part of its overall public interest analysis
under section 214 of the Act. 3 5 The Commission

believed the entry criteria were necessary to promote effective competition in the U.S. market for
international telecommunications services. 3 6 Ac-

cording to this order, the public interest demanded opportunities for all U.S. carriers to innovate in the provision of international servicesincluding their entry into foreign markets-and
limits on the ability of dominant foreign carriers
to leverage their market power in the U.S. market.3

7

Further, this order examined applications

by foreign-affiliated entities for licenses of common carrier radio facilities under section
310(b) (4) of the Act in a similar fashion. 8
At the heart of the Commission's Market Entry
Order was the establishment of the effective comtended line, unless and until there shall first have been
obtained from the Commission a certificate that the
present or future public convenience and necessity require or will require the construction, or operation, or
construction and operation, of such additional or extended line[.]
47 U.S.C. § 214(a). Colloquially, the Commission and industry participants refer to a license to provide international service as a "214 license."
30 47 U.S.C. § 310(b)(4) (1994 & Supp. 11 1996).
'I ForeignParticipationOrder, 12 FCC Rcd. at 23910, para.

45.
32

See Market Entry Order,11 FCC Rcd. at 3878, paras.

10-19.
33

See Foreign Participation Order, 12 FCC Rcd. at 23910,

para. 45
34
35
36
37
38

See
See
See
See
See

id.
Market Entry Order, 11 FCC Rcd. at 3875, para. 1.
id.
id.
id. at 3964, para. 238.
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petitive opportunities analysis ("ECO") to determine whether a foreign affiliated carrier's entry
into the U.S. market is in the public interest.3 9
ECO is a two-pronged test: The first prong addresses whether U.S. carriers have the legal ability
to enter the destination market of the applicant
(de jure ability to enter). 40 The second prong is
comprised of three elements that examine
whether U.S. carriers have the actual ability to
enter the destination market of the applicant (de
facto ability to enter). 4' Specifically, the first element focuses on the terms and conditions of interconnection with the incumbent's network and
whether any barriers to interconnection exist in
the market. 42 The second element focuses on
competitive safeguards that have been put in
place by the regulatory or competition authority
in the destination market to ensure that the incumbent does not leverage its market power to
disadvantage

43a U.S. carrier in this market.

Under the third element, ECO examines the regulatory framework of the incumbent market to deSee id. at 3884-88, paras. 27-39.
See id. at 3890, para. 44. In its application of the dejure
prong of ECO, the Commission has examined such legal entry barriers as the existence of limitations on the number of
licenses to be rewarded or foreign ownership restrictions on
such licenses. See id; see also In re Telecom New Zealand Limited ("TNZL"), Order, Authorization and Certificate, 12 FCC
Rcd. 19379, 19384, para. 11 (1996).
41
See Market Entry Order, II FCC Rcd. at 3890, para. 44.
42
See id. at 3892, para. 49.
43 See id. at 3892, para. 51. The safeguards considered in
the Commission's application of ECO have included "(1) the
existence of cost-allocation rules to prevent cross-subsidization; (2) timely and nondiscriminatory disclosure of technical information needed to use, or interconnect with, carriers'
facilities; and (3) protection of carrier and customer proprietary information." See id; see also In re Hong Kong Telecommunications (Pacific) Limited ("HKTP"), Orderand Authorization, 13 FCC Rcd. 20050, 20064, para. 33 (1998); In re Hong
Kong Telecommunications (Pacific) Limited ("HKTP"), Order on Reconsideration, DA 99-1481 (July 28, 1999).
44 See Market Entry Order, 11 FCC Rcd. at 3894, para. 54.
45 See ISP Reform Order, 14 FCC Rcd. at 7965-66, para. 8
n.8 (defining the accounting rate as "the price a U.S. facilities-based carrier negotiates with a foreign carrier for handling one minute of international telephone service. Each
carrier's portion of the accounting rate is referred to as the
settlement rate. In almost all cases, the settlement rate is
equal to one-half the negotiated accounting rate.").
46
See Market Entry Order, 11 FCC Rcd. at 3890, para. 44.
47
In determining "market power," the Commission examined the following factors: (1) the market share of the applicant's affiliate in the destination market, (2) the supply
elasticity of the destination market, (3) the demand elasticity
of the customer in the destination market and (4) the foreign carrier affiliate's "cost structure, size and resources." In
re Application of KDD America, Order, Authorization and Certif-9

40
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termine whether the regulator and the incumbent are jointly controlled or independent
entities and whether the regulator has the power
to enforce the first three elements of ECO. 44 The

ECO analysis balances all four elements with
other public interest factors-such as cost-based
accounting rates 45 or evidence of existing competition-that are entered into the record to determine whether the application is in the public interest.

46

ECO did not apply to all situations in which a
foreign carrier sought access to the U.S. international telecommunications market. The Commission applied the ECO analysis only if the applicant was affiliated with a foreign carrier with
market power operating in the destination market. 47 Further, it rejected a control standard for

affiliation 48 and determined that a U.S. carrier
was affiliated with a foreign carrier if the foreign
carrier had a twenty-five percent or greater equity
interest in the U.S. carrier applying for the license, or a controlling interest at any level. 49 The
icate, 11 FCC Rcd. 11329, 11334, para. 10 (1996). Two factors
determine supply elasticity: (1) the supply of capacity of existing competitors and (2) low entry barriers. See In re Motion
of AT&T to be Declared Nondominant for International Service, Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 17963, 17980-81, para. 48 (1996).
High demand elasticities indicate a customer's willingness
and ability to switch to or from the carrier in order to obtain
price reductions and desired features. See In re Cable & Wireless, Inc., Order, Authorization and Certificate, 11 FCC Rcd.
16486, 16492-93, at para. 9 n.41 (1996).
48 The Commission had previously held that "...control
is the proper standard for determining affiliation for the purposes of deciding whether a U.S. common carrier should be
regulated as dominant or nondominant in its provision of
U.S. international service." In re Regulation of International
Common Carrier Services, Report and Order, 7 FCC Rcd. 7331,
7332 (1992) [hereinafter International Services Order]. In the
International Services Order, the Commission determined that
without control of a U.S. carrier, the foreign carrier would
not be in a position to direct the actions of the U.S. carrier.
See id. Control is not defined by what it is, rather than what it
is not. The Commission held it would assess whether the foreign carrier had "control" of the U.S. carrier on a case-bycase basis since the variety of stock ownership situations
made an ownership percentage benchmark unreliable. See
id. at 7333, para. 13.
49
See Market Entry Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 3873, para. 78. The
Commission retained the authority to review investments that
are less than twenty-five percent and potentially subject these
to ECO. See id. at 3906, paras. 88-89. Although subjecting
such investments to regulatory review would create some regulatory uncertainty, the Commission reasoned that "in a market such as international telecommunications where some
players possess significant market power, the potential exists
for substantial investments below 25 percent level to have a
dramatic impact on competition in certain limited circumstances." Id. at 3906, para. 89.
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Commission adopted the ECO test to determine
whether foreign interests could control more

than twenty-five percent of a common carrier radio licensee (e.g., a wireless telephony license), it
refused to adopt the test for determining whether
similar investments in broadcast and aeronautical
58
licenses were in the public interest.
In establishing ECO, the FCC seemed to articulate a policy of open and fair trade in the telecommunications services market, 59 but in fact it erected trade protection barriers for the largest of
the U.S. carriers and provided itself with more
regulatory obligations than it could satisfy. The
support of the larger U.S. carriers, 61 who provide
a majority of the international facilities-based services from the U.S., was not exclusively due to a
strong public policy belief that foreign markets
must be opened. ECO provided an opportunity
for them to delay the inevitable entry of foreign
competition in the U.S. international telecommunications market. Until the implementation of the
WTO Basic Telecom Agreement (at the opposition of
the largest U.S. international carrier), U.S. carriers employed such ambiguous standards under
ECO as the definition of "market power" and the
evidentiary showings necessary under the ECO
test to oppose these applications and delay the authorization of potential foreign-affiliated competitors. 6 1 The ECO analysis resulted in delay because
the Commission was required to release an order

50
See Market Entry Order, 11 FCC Rcd. at 3911, para. 99
n.120. "A foreign carrier" is defined as "any entity that is authorized within a foreign country to engage in the provision
of international telecommunications services offered to the
public in that country within the meaning of the International Telecommunications Regulations." Id. This includes
foreign carriers that provide intercity or local access services
or facilities in a foreign country. See id.
51
The Commission rejected applying the ECO test to all
markets, even those where the applicant did not have an affiliate, since this could deny entry where there was little or no
threat to competition. See Market Entry Order, 11 FCC Rcd. at
3917, para. 117. The Commission also rejected the "home
market" test, which would limit ECO to the applicant's home
or primary market and not others, although the applicant
could have market power in these markets. See id. at 3918,
para. 119.
52
See Market Entry Order, 11 FCC Rcd. at 3917, para. 116
(defining bottleneck services or facilities "as those that are
necessary for the provision of international services, including intercity or local access facilities on the foreign end").
53
See id. at 3941-56, paras. 179-219.
54
See 47 U.S.C. § 310(b) (4) (1994 & Supp. 111997). Section 310 states that
no broadcast or common carrier or aeronautical en
route or aeronautical fixed radio station license shall be
granted or held by ... any corporation directly or indirectly controlled by any other corporation of which
more than one-fourth of the capital stock is owned of

record or voted by aliens, their representatives, or by a
foreign government or representative thereof, or by any
corporation organized under the laws of a foreign country, if the Commission finds that the public interest will
be served by the refusal or revocation of such license.
Id.
55 See Market Entry Order, 11 FCC Rcd. at 3951, paras.
206-07.
56 See id. at 3953, para. 212.
57 See id. at 3953, para. 213.
58
See id. at 3945, paras. 190-96.
59 See In re Market Entry and Regulation of Foreign-affiliated Entities, Notice of ProposedRulemaking, 10 FCC Rcd. 4844,
4845, para. 1 (1995) [hereinafter Market Entry Order NPRM].
In the NPRM, the Commission set out three goals: "(1) promote effective competition in the global market for communications services; (2) prevent anticompetitive conduct in the
provision of international services or facilities; and (3) encourage foreign governments to open their communications
markets." Id. In the Market Entry Order, the Commission stated
it would adhere to these goals, with an emphasis on the promoting effective competition in the U.S. telecommunications
services market. 11 FCC Rcd. at 3877, para. 8.
60 See id. at 3883, para. 25 n.22 (listing commenting parties to the Market Entry Order NPRM that supported some version of the ECO test).
61 See Foreign Participation Order, 12 FCC Rcd. at
23906-10, paras. 33-43.

affiliation had to be with a foreign carrier providing telecommunications service, not simply any
foreign interest, 50 and this foreign carrier affiliate
had to be operating in the applicant's destination
market.51 Finally, the affiliate had to have market
power, which was defined as the ability of the carrier to act anticompetitively against unaffiliated
U.S. carriers through the control of bottleneck
52
services or facilities at the foreign end.
The Market Entry Order also addressed a foreignaffiliated entry test for common carrier radio
53
licenses under section 310(b) (4) of the Act. Sec-

tion 310(b)(4) permits corporations with up to
one-fourth foreign ownership of capital stock to
control common carrier, aeronautical or broadcast licenses, but it instructs the Commission to
make a public interest determination in granting
licenses to corporations that are more than
twenty-five percent foreign-controlled. 54 In the

Market Entry Order, the Commission determined
that the public interest demanded that applicants
for common carrier radio licenses be subject to an
ECO test, where it identified a "home market" for
each foreign investor, 55 compared appropriate

market segments 56 and applied the de jure and de
facto prongs to these segments. 57 Although the
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for each application filed by a foreign-affiliated
carrier. These orders made determinations-and
provided future applicants with Commission precedent-as to whether the foreign affiliate had
market power and/or whether the scrutinized
market met the ECO standard. Regardless of the
FCC's determinations, the applicants business
plans suffered due to the inherent delays that accompanied these licensing criteria and procedures.
C.

International 214 Streamlining Order

A few months after releasing the Market Entry
Order,the Commission released its Streamlining Order, which provided the telecommunications community with guidance on the application process
and streamlined many of the requirements for obtaining a license to provide international service. 62 This order introduced the "Global 214," an
application U.S. carriers can submit for the provision of services to all international points as long
as they are not affiliated with a foreign carrier in
any destination markets that would require a market power or ECO demonstration. 6 3 These applications are placed on streamlined review, that is,
they are deemed granted if there are no objections from the Commission or another party
within a certain number of days after the application is placed on public notice. 64 Unaffiliated U.S.
carriers received the most benefit from the Global
214.65 Foreign-affiliated U.S. carriers could apply
for such licenses only as long as their applications
excluded international points where there was an
affiliation with a foreign carrier. 66 For example, a
U.S. carrier affiliated with the dominant carrier in
a particular foreign country could receive global
authority to provide service to all destinations but
the country of affiliation. The carrier could subsequently attempt to garner authority on the affiliSee generally Streamlining Order, II FCC Rcd. 12884.
See id. at 12889, para. 11.
64 See id. at 12891-92, para. 14.
65
WorldCom mentioned in its comments filed in the
Streamlining proceeding, that under the proposed rules it
would only have to file one global application and several
specialized ones, rather than the more than 500 it had filed
prior to the implementation of the Global 214. See id. at
12888, para. 9.
66
See id. at 12884, para. 12.
67
See id. at 12890, para. 12.
68
See generally Streamlining Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 12884.
69 See id. at 12891, para. 14.
70
See id.
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ated route through a separate application subject
67
to theECO test.

The Streamlining Order made the Commission's
licensing regulations more efficient and partially
addressed the resources problem with the ECO
test. 68 Non-affiliated carriers' applications would
be streamlined and approved, and the carriers
permitted to operate within thirty-six days of the
date of Public Notice.6 "' A separately written order
was not necessary, thus saving Commission resources for those applications subject to the ECO
1
analysis.
However, foreign-affiliated carriers remained
subject to a different standard that handicapped
their entry. Whereas an unaffiliated U.S. carrier
could apply for and receive international authority in less than two months, a foreign-affiliated carrier's application would have to include information meeting the ECO criteria. 71 In addition, the
foreign-affiliated carrier was more likely to be subject to the objections of competing U.S. carriers
and require a written authorization by the Commission.
D.

World Trade Organization Basic
Telecommunications Agreement

On February 15, 1997, the WTO Basic Telecommunications Agreement was concluded. Sixtynine nations, 72 including the United States and
most of its major trading partners-representing
ninety percent of worldwide telecommunications
service revenue-committed to opening their
73
markets for basic telecommunications services.
The WO Basic Telecom Agreement is not a standalone agreement, rather it is incorporated into
the WTO's General Agreement on Trade in Services ("GATS").74 In the agreement, signatories
made varying degrees of commitments to open
their markets for international telecommunica-

62

71

63

72

See id.

In addition to its fifteen members, the European

Union is also bound, raising the number of the contracting
parties to the Basic Telecom Agreement to seventy. See Laura

B. Sherman, "Wildly Enthusiastic" About the First Multilateral
Agreement on Trade in Telecommunications Services, 51 FED.
COMM. L.J. 61, 62 n.3 (1998). Although China is not a member of the WTO, Hong Kong remains a member despite its
July 1999 remission to China by virtue of its status as a separate customs territory of the People's Republic of China. See

id.
73

See Foreign ParticipationOrder, 12 FCC Rcd. at 23893,

para. 2.
74

See Sherman, supra note 72, at 62.
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comprehensive approach to regulatory reform
was needed because the telecommunications laws
and regulations in most countries did not foster a
competitive marketplace since most had been
designed when telecommunications had been
monopolized by the state.8 0
The FCC subsequently implemented the commitments made by the United States in its Foreign
ParticipationOrder.8 1 The Commission divided the
applicants between WTO member nations, which
received significant regulatory relief, and nonWTO member nations,8 " which remained subject
to the ECO analysis in effect at the time of the
implementation of the order.8 3 As a result, applicants for Section 214 authority from WTO member nations, seeking authority to exceed the section 310(b)(4) foreign ownership benchmark,

and applicants seeking a cable landing license 84
are no longer required to make an ECO showing.
Instead, these applicants are subject to a rebuttable presumption that as WTO members, they do
not pose concerns that would justify denial of an
application on competitive grounds.8 5 Any anticompetitive concerns raised during the application process by the Commission would be addressed through license denial only if its
dominant carrier safeguards and individualized license conditions could not prevent such activity. 8"i
Under the guise of the protections offered
under the WrO Basic Telecom Agreement, the Foreign
Participation Order addressed two of the major
problems with ECO-trade protectionism and
regulatory obligations.8 7 First, by fully embracing
the WFO Basic Telecom Agreement and substantially
deregulating foreign carrier entry from WTO
member nations, regardless of the carrier's country commitments under the agreement, the Commission's policies reflected a move towards reliance upon competition rather than strict
regulatory supervision. 88 While ECO's primary
goal was to protect U.S. carriers from the competitive pressures of foreign entry, the benefits of an
open-entry policy were denied to consumers by
precluding these competitive pressures.89 The rebuttable presumption offered to applicants from
WTO member nations provided further streamlining in the application process by reducing the
regulatory obligations the Commission made
when it enacted ECO.9 ° The Commission would
have to conduct an ECO analysis and draft an or-

75
See WTO Basic Telecom Agreement, supra note 6, at 1169.
Regardless of the commitments made by the individual countries under the Basic Telecom Agreement, Articles II (Most
Favored Nation) and XVII (National Treatment) of CATS
demand WTO members treat like services and service suppliers from other WTO members no less favorably than they
treat their own services and service suppliers. See id.
76
See Foreign Participation Order, 12 FCC Rcd. at 23903,
para. 27. The Reference Paper was never formally issued as a
WTO document. See id. For a description of the Reference
Paper, see Sherman, supra note 72, at 71-86.
77
See Foreign Participation Order, 12 FCC Rcd. at 23903,
para. 27.
78
See Foreign Participation Order, 12 FCC Rcd. at 24039,
para. 340.
79
Sherman, supra note 72, at 71.
80 See Taunya L. McLarty, Liberalized Telecommunications
Trade in the WfO: Implications for Universal Service Policy, 51
FED. COMM. L.J. 1, 49 (1998).
81 See generally Foreign Participation Order, 12 FCC Rcd.
23891.
82
See id. at 23893, para. 2.

See id. at 23904, paras. 29-30.
The Commission's authority to grant licenses and operation of submarine cables is granted by the President pursuant to the Cable Landing License Act, not the Communications Act. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 34-39 (1994 & Supp. II 1997),
Exec. Order No. 10530, reprinted as amended in 3 U.S.C. § 301
app. at 459-60 (1994). In the Foreign Participation Order, the
Commission initiated an open entry policy, instead of the
ECO analysis, with regard to applications from WTO member nations to land and operate submarine cables in the
United States. See Foreign ParticipationOrder, 12 FCC Rcd. at
23933, para. 93. However, submarine cable landing licenses
still must obtain the approval of the State Department pursuant to E.O. 10,530, regardless of their WTO membership. See
3 U.S.C. § 301 app. at 459-60.
85
See Foreign Participation Order, 12 FCC Rcd. at 23913,
para. 50.
86 See id. at 23913-15, paras. 51-54.
87 See id. at 23904, paras. 29-30.
88 See id. at 23907, para. 38.
89 See id. at 23906, para. 35.
90 See id. at 23906, para. 33.

tions and satellite services. 75

Fifty members agreed to adopt the Reference
Paper,7 6 which sets out procompetitive regulatory
principles. An additional ten members committed
to adopting either part or all of these principles in
the near future. 7 7 The principles of the Reference
Paper include interconnection provisions, competition safeguards, transparency of licensing criteria, universal service policies, independence of
78
the regulator and allocation of scarce resources.
These safeguards were created to prevent monopolies of basic telecommunication from exploiting
"their dominant position to distort market forces
and impede the ability of competitors to supply
networks or services for which commitments
would be made." 79 The negotiators realized that a

83
84
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der only for an applicant affiliated with a foreign
carrier with market power in a non-WTO member
nation. In less than three years, the Commission
significantly reduced the workload in the licensing arena, providing it with the ability to focus its
resources on actual cases of anticompetitive behavior, rather than the theoretical possibility in
every application.
E.

1999 Licensing Reform Order

After a thorough review of its regulations in the
Licensing Reform Order, the Commission further
provided easier entry for new carriers and more
flexibility for existing carriers. 91 The broad application of the ECO test, which provided incumbent U.S. carriers with an popular regulatory tool
to delay competition, and the obligation to release individual orders for each foreign-affiliated
carrier now seem like a distant memory. The Licensing Reform Order is the culmination of the
Commission's efforts to eliminate self-imposed
trade barriers and to streamline its licensing process.
The Licensing Reform Orderwas released after the
Commission conducted a public forum and many
informal meetings with interested members of the
community to examine ways to simplify and eliminate burdens on the industry and the Commission.9 2 The order further streamlined the section
214 licensing process by (1) reducing the streamlined time period from thirty-five to fourteen
days 9 3 (2) expanding the class of applications

subject to streamlining 94 and (3) no longer removing applications from streamlined review
solely due to the filing of a petition to deny. 95 By
expanding the class of applications eligible for
streamlined review to include those on affiliated
routes where the carrier has only resale or mobile
9'

See Licensing eform Order, 14 FCC Rcd. 4909, 4912-33,

paras. 8-56 (streamlining section 214 authorizations and allowing forbearance for proformaassignments and transfers of
control).
92
See generally Licensing Reform Order, 14 FCC Rcd. 4909.
93 See id. at 4912, para. 9.
94 See id. at 4918, para. 20.
95 See id. at 4912-13, para. 9.
96 See supra note 45, defining accounting rates and settlements rates.
97 See In re International Settlement Rates, Report and Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 19806 (1997) [hereinafter Benchmarks Order]; In re International Settlement Rates, Report and Order on
Reconsideration and Order Lifting Stay, 14 FCC Rcd. 9256
(1999) [hereinafter Benchmarks Reconsideration Order].
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facilities, the Commission narrowed the scope of a
possible ECO analysis and the need to issue individualized orders for a great number of applications. Further, the Commission's refusal to automatically remove applications from streamlined
review solely due to the submission of a petition
to deny, regardless of the merits of such a petition, marked an important step in reducing the
ability of U.S. carriers to delay competition on a
particular route.
By summer 1999, the Commission's entry policies shifted from protecting incumbent U.S. carriers from foreign entry into the U.S. market with
its enactment of ECO, toward an open entry policy where all carriers, regardless of affiliation, can
enter the market in a more efficient manner. Yet
the Commission had not adopted a completely
"open-entry" regulatory structure for all foreign
carriers in all circumstances. Several issues precluding this competitive model should be addressed in the Commission's Year 2000 biennial
review.
III.

SETTLEMENT RATES

The accounting rate system defines how international carriers settle accounts with each other
for the exchange of international switched traffic. 96 The Commission set out guidelines for set97
ting accounting rates in the Benchmarks Order,
which unilaterally imposed caps on the amount
U.S. carriers can compensate foreign administrations for the termination of U.S. traffic.
The FCC heard the first accounting rate case in
1936. The case addressed "whipsawing," an anticompetitive activity that harms U.S. telegraph
carriers.9 8 In Mackay Radio & Telegraph Company,
Inc.,99 the FCC refused to grant Mackay Radio's
section 214 application because the proposed ra98

Whipsawing occurs when competitive U.S. carriers

send traffic to a foreign country where communications services are controlled by a defacto or de jure monopolist, often
referred to as a PTr. See In re Uniform Settlement Rates on
Parallel International Communications Routes, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 84 F.C.C.2d. 121, 122, para. 4 (1980)
[hereinafter Uniform Settlement Rates Order]. The PTT receives
a certain amount of international traffic from each U.S. carrier but is under no obligation to send proportional return
traffic or charge equal termination costs. See id. When the
PTT favors one U.S. carrier over another with its return traffic, it exerts its monopoly power over these carriers, thus
harming competition. See id.
99 2 F.C.C. 592 (1936), affd. sub. nom. Mackay Radio and
Telegraph Co., Inc. v. FCC, 97 F.2d 641 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
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dio circuit between the United States and Norway
would not generate additional traffic but would
merely shift the routing of existing traffic from
cable to radio circuits."' Mackay had agreed to
offer Norway a higher accounting rate if it sent all
U.S.-bound telegraph traffic through its radio circuit instead of the transatlantic cables used by
other U.S. carriers for their Norway-bound traffic.' 0 ' The FCC determined this arrangement
would eliminate the U.S.-Norway cable traffic of
another carrier and cause ruinous competition
among U.S.-based international communications
carriers. 102
As a direct result of the Mackay case, the FCC
created the Uniform Settlements Policy ("USP")
in the 1930s.10 3 Under this policy, U.S. international carriers offering identical services to the
same foreign point had to do so under identical
accounting rates, settlement rates and division of
tolls. 10 4 Also, the international record carriers
were prohibited from negotiating exclusive rates
or receiving a disproportionate amount of return
traffic from the foreign correspondent.10 5 This
uniformity requirement ensures that service providers receive fair compensation for their services
and that foreign administrations are prevented
from whipsawing U.S. correspondents. 0 6
The dramatic increase in settlement rate deficits and the asymmetry of accounting rates began
10 7
in the 1980s and continued into the 1990s.
During this period, U.S. regulators began to focus
on the problem of disproportionate accounting
rates and began to develop various remedies. In
1980, the FCC issued a policy statement reaffirming the need for the USP but stated that the public interest may warrant waivers of the policy in
certain cases.' 0 8 In 1986, the FCC changed the

102

See Mackay Radio, 2 F.C.C. at 600.
See id. at 596.
See id.

103

See

name of the USP to the International Settlements
Policy ("ISP") and simplified and streamlined the
waiver process.1 09
A. Modern-Day Accounting Rate Regulation
Until the ISP Reform Orderwas released in 1999,
the ISP was codified in sections 43.511 10 and
64.1001111 of the Commission's rules. These sec-

tions regulated the operating agreements, which
are basically private contracts between a U.S. international carrier and a foreign carrier. With the
exception of the mandatory benchmark settlement rate ceilings imposed in 1997,112 the FCC
does not dictate prices the U.S. carrier may contract with a foreign carrier. However, it does demand that the carrier file the operating agreements with the FCC, and that these contracts
adhere to proportional return and nonexclusivity
regulations.
Section 43.51 required all U.S. non-dominant
carriers who entered into an operating agreement
with another carrier to provide foreign communications to file a copy of the agreement with the
Commission within thirty days of execution.' 13
Operating agreements include provisions concerning the division of tolls, the basis of settlement of traffic balances and the accounting rates.
If the operating agreement or an amendment to
an existing agreement included a division of tolls,
accounting rates or other items not identical to
the equivalent terms and conditions in the operating agreement of another U.S. carrier, the filing
carrier had to file a notification letter or waiver
request with the International Bureau pursuant to
section 64.1001.

14

If the rate is simply lower and there are no

104

million in 1979 to $2.4 billion in 1989. See Kenneth B. Stanley, Balance of Payments, Deficits, and Subsidies in International
Communications Services: A New Challenge to Regulation, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 411, 414. (1991). The cumulative deficit for the
period was $12.5 billion, most of it accruing from 1985 to
1989. See id.
108 See Uniform Settlement Rates Order, 84 F.C.C.2d 121,

105

para. 1.

100
101

CHARLES

H.

KENNEDY

&

M.

VERONICA PASTOR, AN

INTRODUCrION TO INTERNATIONAl TELECOMMUNIATIONS LAw

126 (1996).
See id.
See generally 47 C.F.R. §§ 43.51, 64.10001 (1996).
106 See Stuart Z. Chiron and Lise A Rehberg, Fostering
Competition in InternationalTelecommunications, 38 FED. COMM.
L.J. 1, 45. (1987). Foreign administrations may whipsaw U.S.
carriers by indicating that unless certain terms or conditions
of their operating agreements are changed the inbound traffic to that particular operator will decrease. See id. This decrease in inbound traffic will adversely impact the revenue of
the U.S. operator. See id.
The U.S. balance of payments deficit grew from $312
107

109 See In re Implementation and Scope of the Uniform
Settlements Policy for Parallel Routes, Final Rule, 51 Fed.
Reg. 4736 (Feb. 7, 1986).
110 47 C.F.R. § 43.51 (1996).
III
112
113
114

47 C.F.R. § 64.1001 (1996).
See infra Part III.C.
See 47 C.F.R. § 43.51(a) (1996).
See 47 C.F.R. § 43.51(d) (1996).
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other modifications, such as an increase in return
traffic, then the carrier had to file a notification
letter under section 64.1001(e), stating the new
rate and noting that there has been no other
.modification in the operating agreement.' 15 If the
operating agreement included a difference that
was not a simple rate reduction, the carrier had to
file a waiver request under section 64.1001(f).'I1,'
This waiver request had to thoroughly explain the
proposed modifications in the operating agree7 Both notification
ment with the foreign carrier. 11
letters and waiver requests should have included
statements that the filing carrier had not bargained for exclusive availability of the new accounting rate or bargained for more than its proportionate share of return traffic.' 18 The carrier
also had to state that it had informed the foreign
administration that U.S. policy required that competing U.S. carriers have access to accounting
rates on a nondiscriminatory basis.' '19
In 1996, the Commission authorized U.S. carriers to negotiate alternative settlement arrangements that deviated from the requirements of the
ISP with any foreign correspondent carrier in a
country that satisfied the ECO test.'2 0 The Com-

mission would consider other alternative settlements arrangements to countries that had not satisfied ECO if the applicant could demonstrate
that such a deviation would promote market-oriented pricing and competition while precluding
the abuse of market power by the foreign correspondent.1 21 These criteria were amended in the
Foreign Participation Order when the Commission

replaced ECO as the threshold standard for determining when to permit accounting rate flexibility
with carriers from WTO member nations, with a
rebuttable presumption that flexibility is permitted for carriers from WTO member nations. 122
See 47 C.F.R. § 64.1001(e) (1996).
See 47 C.F.R. § 64.1001(f) (1996).
117
See id.
1 18 See id.
119 47 C.F.R. § 64.1001(g) (1996).
120
See In re Regulation of International Accounting
Rates, Phase II, Fourth Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 20063,
para. 2 (1996) [hereinafter Flexibility Order].
121
See id.
122
See Foreign Participation Order, 12 FCC Rcd. at 24026,
115

116

para. 302.
123 The ITU is a specialized agency of the United Nations that was originally founded in the 19th Century to universalize telegraph service among nations. See KENNEDY & PASsupra note 103, at 30-31. Today, the ITU provides
oversight to international matters concerning telecommuniTOR,
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No international organization has the authority
to enforce or adjudicate accounting rates. The International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee ("CCITT") of the International
Telecommunications Union ("ITU") 12 3 had established a set of recommendations for international
service, providing the basis for dividing revenue
from international communications service between countries.

124

In 1992, the CCITT approved

Recommendation D.140, which recommended
that accounting rates reflect the cost of providing
the service and that they are not discriminatory
between operators. 2' 5 However, this recommen-

dation is not binding because the ITU does not
possess enforcement or dispute resolution authority. The FCC has since established mandatory set26
tlement rate benchmarks for U.S. carriers. 1
B.

Settlement Rate Deficit

The asymmetry between accounting and collection rates has reached a point where settlement
payments are a substantial factor in the United
States trade deficit. The decrease in settlement
rates and telecommunications costs are reflected
in lower collection rates, the rates customers pay.
Settlement payments have steadily increased and
recently leveled off even though accounting rates
and telecommunications costs have decreased
substantially. 127 There is no single factor that is a
catalyst to these disproportionate rates; instead,
there is a multitude of factors. Some are artificially created by foreign operators and governments, such as taxation of telecommunications
services, but many are unintentional results of
market forces.1

28

The international settlement payments deficit
increases when accounting rates do not decrease
cations standards, radio matters, and international development. See id. at 32. The CCITT represents the telecommunications standardization sector of the ITU and is now referred
to as the "ITU-T." See id.
124 See Stanley, supra note 107, at 414-15.
125
See KENNEDY & PASTOR, supra note 104, at 131-32.
126
See generally Benchmarks Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 19806;
Benchmarks"Reconsideration Order, 14 FCC Rcd. 9256.
127
See FCC INTERNAFIONAL BUREAU, REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKETS 1999 UPDATE,Jan. 14,
2000 available at <www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/International/Re-

ports/tmreport.pdf>.
128
See Robert M. Frieden, Accounting Rates: The Business
of InternationalTelecommunications and the Incentive to Cheat, 43
FED. COMM. L.J 111, 117-18 (1991).
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proportionally with the cost of international
switched services. The FCC reported that between
1985 and 1994, U.S. carriers paid a total of $26
billion in settlement payments to foreign carriers;
nearly half of these payments were thought to
have exceeded the actual costs of terminating
calls. 1 29 Since 1985, the net settlement outpay-

ment has quadrupled, reaching over $5.45 billion
in 1997.130 In 1988, it was estimated that three out
of every four dollars that U.S. carriers collected
for international calls were owed to the foreign
carrier for terminating the calls.13 1 The ITU has
estimated that, of the $55 billion spent on international phone calls by each country in 1995, only
1
$30 billion was needed to cover costs.

32

Foreign PTTs and governments directly cause
some of the disparity in accounting rates and traffic. The primary institutional structure aggravating the U.S. deficit in this area is the subsidy some
PTTs have built into the cost of terminating calls
from the United States. These payments often
subsidize local telephone service, postal operations, and even such programs as currency solvency that are ancillary to international telecom33

munications. 1

There are other institutional pressures that increase U.S. settlement rates. These factors include
(1) the FCC's regulations to prevent whipsawing
by decreasing incentives to lower accounting
129
See In re Policy Statement on International Accounting Rate Reform, Policy Statement, 11 FCC Rcd. 3146, 3147,

para. 9 (1996).
130

See FCC,

THE U.S

CCB INDUSTRY ANALYSIs DIVISION, TRENDS IN

INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS

INDUSTRY,

at

tbl.24 (authored by Linda Blake &Jim Lande) (1999). This
number includes settlement payments and receipts for international telephone, telex, and telegraph. The following reflects the settlement data for the past five years, in millions of
U.S. dollars:
Settlement
Settlement
Deficit
Payments
Receipts
Year
3,707
6,645
2,938
1993
4,291
7,294
31003
1994
4,943
8,016
3,073
1995
5,655
8,484
2,829
1996
5,450
8,315
2,865
1997
See Frieden, supra note 128, at 115 n.1l.
131
132 See Bryan Gruley & Douglas Lavin, U.S. Aims to Reduce
Ratesfor InternationalPhone Calls,WALL ST. J. EUROPE, Nov. 18,
1996, at 3.
See Stanley, supra note 107, at 431.
133
See Frieden, supra note 128, at 114.
134
135 Accounting rates are often set in Special Drawing
Rights ("SDR"), which is an international currency unit that
is determined by the International Monetary Fund and based

rates, 13 4 (2) the fact that prices are set in U.S. dollars whereas accounting rates are calculated in
monetary units other than U.S. dollars, 1 35 (3) the
effects of taxation of telephone service in foreign
countries' 3 6 and (4) the discriminatory practice of
some countries that charge higher settlement
rates to terminate U.S. traffic than traffic from
other countries.

37

1

Increased U.S. settlement payments, however,
are mainly the result of several different market
forces. First, outbound traffic greatly exceeds inbound traffic. 3" The reasons for the increased
outbound traffic include the large number of
wealthy immigrants in the U.S. calling abroad, 139
the lack of direct dial and high PTT originating
costs that retard demand and usage in their respective countries and the competitive market in
the U.S. that lowers cost and increases demand
and usage in this country. Second, new services
have added a third player into the international
settlements process. International 800 and thirdparty billing arrangements, such as credit cards,
have created a situation where the country responsible for the billing and the settlement payments may not have originated the phone call.
For example, in a country beyond call, 140 the billing country may not be either the originating or
terminating country, yet it must pay a settlement
rate to the terminating country and the originaton the average of a basket of currencies. See Trade in Telecommunications:A Glossary of Technical Terms (visited Oct. 4, 1999)
<www.itu.int>. As of Sept. 24, 1999, each SDR was worth approximately $.723. See id.
136 See Stanley, supra note 107, at 419.
137

See id. at 433.

138 See generally FCC, 1998 SECTION 43.61 INTERNATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS DATA, (authored by Linda Blake and
Jim Lande) (2000) available at <www.fcc.gov/ccb/stats>.
139

See Gruley & Lavin, supra note 132, at 3.

140

Home country beyond enables a caller.in one coun-

try to access directly a home country direct service provider

of a second country for the purpose of placing a call terminating outside the second country. ITU Database (visited
Feb. 14, 2000) <www.itu.int/sancho.html>. Home country beyond involves a two-stage international call and will require

the home country direct service provider to have bilateral
agreements in place with both the service access provider
and the service delivery provider which will permit calls be-

tween the origin and destination countries involved. See id.
For example, a U.S. carrier subscriber making a call from

Brazil to France would call the access number in the United
States, receive dial tone from the U.S., then call on to France.
The Brazilian operator recognizes this as a Brazil-to-U.S. call
and the French operator recognizes this as a U.S.-to-France
call. When the two legs are less expensive than a direct dial,
home country direct becomes a viable option.
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ing country, thus aggravating the settlements balance of that country. Third, uncollectable payments and calling fraud adversely affect the U.S.
based carrier since it does not collect the charge
but must pay the foreign carrier for terminating
the call. Fourth, U.S. carriers did not have a substantial incentive to lower accounting rates, until
the deregulation included in the ISP Reform Order,
because ISP regulations bound them to equal accounting rates and proportional return.
C.

Benchmark Settlement Rate Order

The U.S. government attempted for years to address the settlement rate deficit and achieve costbased settlement rates by means of discussion and
negotiation bilaterally and multilaterally at the
ITU, the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development ("OECD") and other international organizations. In 1997, the Commission imposed caps on the amount a U.S. carrier can pay a
41
foreign carrier for its settlement of U.S. traffic.
The Benchmarks Ordernoted that these benchmark
settlement rates were necessary because, under
the international accounting rate system at that
the time, the settlement rates U.S. carriers paid to
foreign carriers to terminate U.S.-originated trafSee generally Benchmarks Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 19806.
See id. at 19807, para. 2.
143 See id. The settlement rate benchmark condition
adopted in the Benchmarks Order is intended to reduce the
ability of U.S.-licensed carriers to engage in a predatory price
squeeze. See id. A price squeeze refers to a strategy of predation that would involve the foreign carrier setting high
(above-cost) international settlement rates while its U.S. affiliate offers "low" prices for domestic IMTS services in competition with the other carriers. See id. Because the foreign carrier's international termination services are a necessary input
for providing IMITS services, the foreign carrier can create a
situation where the relationship between "high" international settlement rates and its U.S. affiliate's "low" prices for
IMTS services forces competing carriers to lose money or customers, even if they are more efficient than the affiliate at
providing international service. See id. at 19901, para. 208.
A proposal was made by the larger domestic carriers in the
Foreign Participation Proceeding to extend this condition to
the licenses of all foreign-affiliated U.S. carriers, whether resale or facilities-based authority. See ForeignParticipationOrder,
12 FCC Rcd. at 23979, para. 198. If implemented, arguably
such a condition would have precluded all means of the carrier to provide traffic on any route in which it had an affiliate
offering a settlement rate above benchmark. The Commission declined to apply the settlement rate benchmark condition to switched resale providers because the switched reseller has substantially less incentive to engage in a predatory
price squeeze than a facilities-based carrier. See id. Due to the
switched resellers' lack of control of essential facilities, it
141

142
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fic are in most cases substantially above the cost
42
foreign carriers incur to terminate that traffic.1
The Commission expressed a belief that abovecost settlement rates not only harmed U.S. consumers through higher than necessary international calling rates, but also provided funding necessary for foreign carriers to finance strategies
that create competitive distortions in the market
for U.S. international services. 143 The settlement
rate deficit, which was partially the result of high
settlement rates, reached a total of $5.4 billion in
44
1996, double what it was in 1990.1

The benchmark rates adopted in the order are
145
based on a Tariff Component Price ("TCP"),
an average of a foreign carriers' publicly available
tariff rates and other information made available
to or estimated by the Commission. Most country
routes146 were assigned according to their economic development, as defined by a World Bank
and ITU classification

scheme. 147

The three

benchmarks adopted are fifteen cents per minute
for upper income countries; nineteen cents per
minute for upper middle income and lower middle income countries; and twenty-three cents per
minute for lower income countries.14 1 The Com-

mission would rely on petitions by interested parties and the international telecommunications
could not force all facilities based-carriers to exit the market
or prevent subsequent entry. See id. at 19898, para. 199. Also,
such activity would easily be detectable by the Commission or
the underlying facilities carrier because a significant portion
of its costs, and the wholesale rate at which it takes service
from the underlying facilities-based carrier, is known or easily
attainable. See id. at 19900, para. 204.
144 See Benchmarks Order, 12 FCC Rcd. at 19812, para. 13.
145 See id. at 19829, para. 49. The Tariff Component
Price ("TCP") methodology uses three network components
to calculate each country basket: (1) the "international facility component" consisting of "international transmission facilities, both cable and satellite, including the link to international switching facilities"; (2) the "international gateway
component" consisting of "international switching centers
and associated transmission and signaling equipment"; and
(3) "national extension component," consisting of "national
exchanges, national transmission, and the local loop facilities
used to distribute international service within a country." Id.;
see also Lawrence J. Spiwak, From International Competitive Carrier to the WTO: A Survey of the FCC's International Telecommunications Policy Initiatives 1985-1998, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 111,
227 n.323 (1998).
146
The Benchmarks Order assigned benchmark settlement
rates for most, but not all, countries on its International
Points List. See Benchmarks Order, 12 FCC Rcd. at 19815, para.
19.
147
See id.
148
See id.
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service agreement filing obligations of U.S. carriers for disclosure of these rates to determine compliance.' 49 The order adopted five transition periods for U.S. carriers to negotiate settlement rates
at or below the benchmarks: one year for carriers
from upper income countries (Jan. 1, 1999); two
years for carriers from upper middle income
countries (Jan. 1, 2000); three years for carriers
from lower middle income countries (Jan. 1,
2001); four years for carriers in lower income
countries (Jan. 1, 2002); and five years for countries with telephone penetration rates that are less
than one in one-hundred (Jan. 1, 2003).150

The Commission also conditioned section 214
authorizations to provide facilities-based international services to countries where the licensee had
an affiliate to offer settlement rates at or below
51
the relevant benchmark on the affiliated route.'
The benchmark was applied regardless of the affiliate's market power or ability to control settlement rates in its market. 15 2 This condition prohibited a U.S. carrier from using its facilities-based
149

See 47 C.F.R. § 43.51 (1998).

150

See Benchmarks Order, 12 FCC Rcd. at 19816, para. 22.
See id. at 19910, para. 228.
This condition was subsequently amended in the

151
152

Benchmarks Reconsideration Order, 14 FCC Rcd. at 9269-72, paras. 39-46. In that order, the Commission reasoned that the
condition for facilities-based service to affiliated markets
should apply solely to U.S. carriers that are providing service
on a route where they have an affiliate with market power.
Market power is defined as controlling more than 50 percent
of the market. See id. at 9270, para. 40. A predation strategy
would make sense for a U.S. carrier only if its foreign affiliate
had sufficient terminating facilities in the foreign market to
terminate all the traffic generated by the U.S. carriers. See id.
Because a carrier that lacks market power would most likely
lack these facilities, there is not a sufficient danger of anticompetitive behavior. See id. at 9270-71, para. 41.
153
See Benchmarks Orde, 12 FCC Rcd. at 19910, para. 228.
'54 See id. at 19896, para. 192.
155
See In re International Settlement Rates, Order, 13 FCC
Rcd. 9188 (1998). This condition on section 214 licenses obtained prior to Jan. 1, 1998, was stayed pending a petition
from MCI. See id. at 9184, para. 4. In June 1999, the FCC
released its Reconsideration Order in the Benchmark docket
and lifted the stay on this condition, but imposed a modified
condition where only U.S. carriers with foreign affiliates with
market power would have their facilities licenses conditioned. See Benchmarks Reconsideration Order, 14 FCC Rcd. at
9269-72, paras. 39-46.
156
See MICHAEL TYLER, TRANSFORMING ECONOMIC RELANo. 7 (visited October 4, 1999) <www.itu.int>. Refile occurs when an
operator takes its international traffic to a country where an
open competitive market and low charges apply for forwarding of traffic to its ultimate destination in a "third" country.
See id. Refile is selected in order to minimize the originating
operator's cost for terminating internal calls. See id. The ter-
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authority to provide switched service on a route
unless the foreign affiliate offered settlement
rates at or below the relevant benchmark. 5' The
Commission's concern was that foreign-affiliated
international services licensees operating in the
United States could engage in anticompetitive behavior through a price squeeze. This would harm
unaffiliated U.S. carriers and would eventually result in a decrease in competition on the particular
route. 154 The condition affected foreign affiliated
licensees because they would have to cease service
on the affiliated route unless its foreign affiliate
offered U.S. carriers benchmark settlement rates
by April 1, 1998.155
The Commission recognized that routing and
bypass arrangements such as refile,' 56 switched
hubbing 157 and International Simple Resale,

158

as

well as increased competition and development
on the foreign end, were placing downward pressure on accounting rates. However, through its
Benchmarks Order, the Commission returned to a
ratemaking methodology similar to the treatment
minating operator sees this traffic as originating in the middle country, not the originating country, and therefore will
charge the accounting rate agreed to between these carriers.
See id. This is distinct from transit traffic, which is part of the
traditional settlement systems and would disclose the
originating country to the terminating operator. See id.
157 See Market Entry Order, 11 FCC Rcd. at 3938, para. 169.
"Switched hubbing" refers to the practice of hubbing inbound or out-bound traffic through an "equivalent" country
from or to a non-equivalent country. See id. This practice
placed downward pressure on accounting rates since carriers
could aggregate their traffic through a competitive market
and route collectively to or from a less competitive market.
See id.
158
See Foreign ParticipationOrder, 12 FCC Rcd. at 23924,
para. 72. International Simple Resale ("ISR") refers to the
provisioning of switched basic service via international private lines interconnected to the public switched telephone
network at one or both ends. See id. ISR allows a carrier to
provide international switched traffic outside the accounting
rate system, thus placing downward pressure on accounting
rates. See In re Regulation of International Accounting Rates
(Phase 1I), First Report and Order, 7 FCC Rcd. 559, 560, para.
12 (1991). The Commission permitted ISR on select routes
that it determined offered "equivalent" resale opportunities
to U.S. carriers, a test that is similar, but not the same as
ECO. See Market Entry Order, 11 FCC Rcd. at 3926, para. 138.
At this time, the Commission will permit ISR on a WTO
member nation route if the market is proved to be
"equivalent" or at least 50 percent of the settled U.S.-billed
traffic on the route or routes in question are at or below the
relevant benchmark settlement rate. See Foreign Participation
Order, 12 FCC Rcd. at 23927, para. 79. For non-WTO member
country routes, the market must satisfy both the equivalency
test and the 50-percent settlement test. Foreign Participation
Order, 12 FCC Rcd. at 23944, para. 129 n.251.
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of dominant, incumbent local exchange carriers.
Unlike rate-of-return or price-cap methodology,
the Commission based its settlement rates on information gathered from interested parties and
unreliable sources, 159 such as tariffs that included
uncollectables, universal service and other irrelevant costs,'" and averaged all of these costs together rather than assigning rates on an individual country basis.
The Benchmarks Order was extremely beneficial
to U.S. carriers and strongly disadvantaged foreign carriers, foreign-affiliated U.S. carriers and
ultimately U.S. consumers. Unlike the mandated
reduction in similar domestic scenarios, no U.S.
facilities-based carrier was obliged to flow through
any of the cost savings associated with the lower
settlement rates in the form of lower collection
rates to U.S. consumers."' The FCC and state regulatory authorities often require domestic longdistance providers to demonstrate access charge
reductions through tariff filings and flow-through
plans. 16 2 In the case of international traffic, the
Commission concluded the marketplace would
pass these rate reductions on to consumers.
The order was unclear on how the conditions
in the Benchmarks Order were to be enforced.
Clearly, facilities-based section 214 licenses were
conditioned on affiliated routes and new requirements were imposed for ISR routes, 16: but the
Commission did not elaborate how it would enforce the benchmark rates on unaffiliated routes.
If a country's international carriers are not offering benchmark rates by the dates indicated in the
order, the Commission stated that it would work

with the appropriate government authorities to
lower the settlement rates by emphasizing cooperation and the decisions of the ITU in Recommendation D.140. 164 Ironically, this unilaterally imposed rate cap relied on bilateral and multilateral
mechanisms for enforcement. U.S. carriers may
request Commission action in such circumstances
by filing a petition that (1) demonstrates that they
have been unable to negotiate a settlement rate
with its foreign correspondent in compliance with
the order and (2) requests enforcement measures
to be initiated to ensure that no U.S. carrier pays
the foreign correspondent an amount exceeding
the lawful settlement rate benchmark.
Enforcement of the Benchmarks Order began in
June 1999, when the Commission's International
Bureau, pursuant to petitions filed by AT&T, MCI
WorldCom and Sprint, ordered all U.S. carriers to
pay the benchmark settlement rate of fifteen
cents per minute on the U.S.-Cyprus and U.S.-Kuwait routes. 16 5 In Cyprus, the petitioners had unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate with the Cyprus Telecommunications Authority to lower its
settlement rate to fifteen cents from their rate of
thirty-seven cents per minute. 16 6 Likewise, the
Commission released a similar order based on the
petitioners' claim that the negotiations had been
fruitless to lower the settlement rate of Kuwait
from seventy-eight cents per minute to the benchmark rate. 167
While both of these disputes are ongoing and
the Benchmarks Order failed to specify particular
enforcement actions, there is Commission precedent in international accounting rate disputes. In

159
See Benchmarks Order, 12 FCC Rcd. at 19855, para. 102.
The Commission admitted that the use of tariff data to calculate settlement rate benchmarks is that any inefficiencies in
foreign carriers' tariffed prices will be noted in the TCP. See
id.
160 See id. Cost information submitted by domestic carriers was not made readily available on the record for foreign
interests to question. See Cable & Wireless PLC v. FCC, 166
F.3d 1224, 1233 (D.C. Cir. 1999).

163 In the Benchmarks Order, the Commission required
carriers to satisfy the "equivalency" test for ISR and demonstrate at least 50 percent of the settled, U.S.-billed traffic on
the route is at or below the appropriate settlement rate
benchmark. See Benchmarks Order, 12 FCC Rcd. at 19917, para.
243. This condition was subsequently amended in the Foreign
ParticipationOrderby exempting the equivalency test on WTO
member nation routes. See id. at 19922-23, para. 259.
164 See id. at 19893, para. 185.
165 See In re AT&T Corp., MCI WorldCom, Inc., Sprint
Communications Co., L.P.; Petition for Enforcement of International Settlements Benchmark Rates for Service with Cyprus, Order, 14 FCC Rcd. 8874 (1999) [hereinafter Cyprus Order]; See aLso In re AT&T Corp., MCI WorldCom, Inc. Sprint
Communications Co., L.P.; Petition for Enforcement of International Settlements Benchmark Rates for Service with
Kuwait, Order, 14 FCC Rcd. 8868 (1999) [hereinafter Kuwait

1 iI

See Benchmarks Order, 12 FCC Rcd. at 19930, para. 270.

The Commission held that the combination of new entrants
into the market, the WTO Basic Telecom Agreement, and its
settlement rate policy would lower costs and increase competition, thus not necessitating a pass-through requirement. See
id.
16"2 See, e.g., 1n reGranting Petitions for Simplified Review
and Approval of Flow-Through of Access Charge Reductions,
Order, North Carolina Utilities Commission, Dkt. No. P-100,
SUB 72, et al. (June 15, 1999) (exemplifying the mandatory
flow through of access charge reductions imposed by many
state public utility commissions).

Order].
166

167

See Cyprus Order, 14 FCC Rcd. at 8874, para. 15.
See Kuwait Order, 14 FCC Rcd. at 8868, para. 15.
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1996, the Commission ordered all U.S. carriers to
cease providing settlements payments to Telintar,
the monopoly provider of international switched
service in Argentina, due to anticompetitive actions taken during a contract dispute with
AT&T.' 68 Eventually, Telintar made the most economical choice under the circumstances and
ceased these practices; traffic eventually resumed.
D.

Response and Appeal

A number of foreign carriers and administrations took issue with the Commission's unilateral
imposition of settlement rate restrictions. Most of
the ninety commentors to the Commission's notice opposed the Commission's unilateral approach to high settlement rates and questioned
the Commission's reliance on the TCP and the
lack of information on how these rates were determined. 1 69 These opponents requested that the

Commission rely instead on market forces and
multilateral negotiations to make settlement rates
cost-based.' 70 On the other hand, domestic interests applauded the implementation of the order
and requested that the Commission provide even
17 1
more downward pressure on these rates.
Several adversely affected parties challenged
the Commission's order in the U.S. Court of Appeals. 172 Petitioners, including various parties representing over 100 foreign governments, regulators, and telecommunications companies,
challenged the Benchmarks Order on several
grounds. First and foremost, they claimed that the
FCC, by limiting the settlement rates foreign carriers may charge U.S. carriers, had asserted extraterritorial jurisdiction over foreign carriers and
foreign telecommunications services, thereby exSee In reAT&T Corp. Proposed Extension of Account168
ing Rate Agreement for Switched Voice with Argentina, Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 18014 (1996); see also Spiwak, supra note
145, at 164.
169
See generally Benchmarks Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 19806.
170
See id. at 19814-15, at para. 18.
171
See id. at 19854.
172
See generally Cable & Wireless, P.L.C. v. FCC, 166 F.3d
1224 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
173 See id. at 1229.
174
See id.
175
See id.
176
See id. at 1230.
177 See id..at 1229.
178
See Cable & Wireless, 166 F.3d at 1230.
179 See id. at 1231.
180
See id.

ceeding its authority under the Communications
Act and the International Telecommunications
Union Treaty. 173 Second, even if the Benchmarks

Order did not regulate foreign carriers, it unlawfully regulated domestic carriers by restricting the
prices they may pay to non-FCC-regulated entities. 174 Third, the benchmark settlement rates set
by the Commission were arbitrary, capricious and
unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, and the Commission's conditioning of the
section 214 licenses held by foreign-affiliated carriers was unlawfully discriminatory and inadequately justified.

75

The Court held in favor of the Commission on
each of these grounds. First, the Court held that
the Benchmarks Order does not regulate foreign
carriers or foreign telecommunications services
and therefore does not violate the Communications Act. 17 6 The benchmark rates apply only to
what U.S. carriers, subject to the Commission's jurisdiction, may pay for termination of U.S.originated traffic.17 7 Although the effect of this
regulation may impact foreign carriers, that alone
does not result in the FCC exceeding its jurisdiction. Second, the court rejected the petitioner's
arguments that the Communications Act only permits the Commission to regulate the terms by
which U.S. carriers offer telecommunications services to the public, not the prices U.S. carriers pay
to non-FCC-regulated entities for goods and services.'1 7 The D.C. Circuit cited several sections of

the Communications Act, including section 201179
(ratemaking authority), section 205180 (authority
to declare a practice unlawful) and section 211181
(authority to mandate amendments to contracts
filed with the Commission), as well as the MobileSierra doctrine,' 82 which provides the CommisSee id. at 1231-32.
See generally FCC v. Sierra Pacific Power Co., 350 U.S.
348 (1956); United Gas Co. v. Mobile Gas Corp., 350 U.S.
332 (1956) (referred to as the "Mobile-Sierra Doctrine").
Under this doctrine, "the Commission has the power to prescribe a change in contract rates when it finds them to be
unlawful . .. and to modify other provisions of private contracts when necessary to serve the public interest." Western
Union Telegraph Co. v. FCC, 815 F.2d 1495, 1501 n.2 (D.C.
Cir. 1987).
Although the legal standard for changing contract rates,
(they must be 'unlawful') differs from the standard for
changing other contract provisions (they must disserve
'the public interest'), in fact the two standards are not
very different. Before changing rates, the Commission
must make. a finding that they are 'unlawful' according
to the terms of the governing statute, which typically re181

182
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sion with the authority to prescribe maximum settlement rates. 8 3 Third, the court rejected the argument that the Benchmarks Order violated the
Administrative Procedure Act by calculating rates
that undercompensate foreign carriers or by
drawing conclusions on data not included on the
record. 8

4

It held that the reliance on the TCP

methodology was justifiable because foreign carriers did not produce cost information on the record that would enable the Commission to rely on
more accurate information.

18

5

The decision was

not appealed.
E.

ISP Reform Order

The Commission's International Settlements
Policy was addressed in the 1998 biennial review.' 8 6 Pursuant to its section 11(a)(2) biennial
review criteria, the Commission held that in most
circumstances the ISP is no longer necessary or in
the public interest as the result of meaningful economic competition in the international telecommunications market. 8

7

The Commission found

that in most circumstances the ISP reduced incentives for U.S. carriers to negotiate low settlement
rates, because the rate provided to one carrier is
available to all carriers.' 8 It also found that "the
proportionate return requirement of the ISP can
distort competition in the U.S. market," and impede the entrance of new competitors 18 9 and that
the uniform settlement rates and public disclosure requirements inhibit competition at the retail level. 190
The Commission removed its ISP requirements-but not the benchmark settlement
rates-for settlement agreements with foreign
carriers lacking market power.' 9 1 The Commission originally proposed removing the ISP for arrangements with non-dominant carriers in WTO
quires a finding that existing rates are unjust, Unreasonable, unduly discriminatory, or preferential.

Id.

183

See Cable & Wireless, 166 F.3d at 1232.

184
185

See id. at 1232-34.
See id. at 1233.

186

See generally ISP Reform Order, 14 FCC Rcd. 7963.
See id. at 7964, para. 2.
See id. at 7972, para. 24.
See id. at 7972, para. 25.
See ISP Reform Order 14 FCC Rcd. at 7973, para. 27.
See id. at 7973, para. 29.

187

188
189
190

19'
192 See In re 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review-Reform of
the International Settlements Policy and Associated Filing
Requirements, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13 FCC Rcd.
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member nations.' 2 However, the order included
all such arrangements, concluding that a carrier
without market power will be unable to adversely
affect competition in the U.S. regardless of its
home country's membership in the WTO. 193 Further, on certain select routes where the U.S. inbound traffic is settled at twenty-five percent or
more below the prescribed benchmark rate, the
ISP was entirely eliminated even for arrangements
with the dominant carrier. 19 4 Arrangements with

the dominant carrier still have to be filed with the
Commission, but these filings are no longer publicly available. 1 95 This filing is required to ensure
that U.S. carriers do not enter into arrangements
that would allow the foreign carrier to exercise its
market power to the detriment of U.S. consumers.

However, the order recognized that public

'16

disclosure could have a chilling effect on pro-com97
petitive termination arrangements. 1
The ISP Reform Order correctly recognized that a
regulatory system originally implemented to govern telegraph traffic between monopoly providers
is no longer applicable in this age of multiple operators, least of all cost routing and internet telephony. "1-81 The Commission stopped short of
abandoning the ISP altogether, clearly recognizing that, under most circumstances, regulatory
oversight and mandated disclosure of costs are
unnecessary and potentially harmful in the international telecommunications market.19 9 Nevertheless, the Commission still maintains its
benchmarks-although one of its primary means
of monitoring such costs has been eliminatedand it has not demonstrated any willingness to
abandon them in place of market pressures.
IV.

POST-REVIEW

During 1999, the Commission enforcement of
15320 (1998) [hereinafter ISP Reform NPRA].
193 See ISP Reform Order, 14 FCC Rcd. at 7971, para. 20.
l194 See id. at 7982, para. 52. At the time the order was
released, these routes included Canada, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Germany, France, Hong Kong, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway. See Commission Releases List
of International Routes that Satisfy Criteria for Relief from
the International Settlements Policy and Associated Filing
Requirements, Public Notice, 14 FCC Rcd. 12158 (1999).
'95
See ISP Reform Order, 14 FCC Rcd. at 7989, para 67.
196 See id. at 7989, para. 69.
197 See id.
198 See id. at 7964, para. 2.
199

See id. at 7965, para. 6.
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A Step in the Right Direction

the "public interest," the statutory standard by
which it regulates international telecommunications and the entry of foreign carriers, can be concluded to be a mix of pro-U.S. consumer regulation and U.S. carrier protectionism. These are
neither mutually exclusive nor fundamentally
consistent objectives. The Market Entry Order, with
its evidentiary standard obligations on foreign-affiliated carriers, and the Benchmarks Order, with its
mandatory cost reductions and absent flowthrough obligations, had the effect of protecting
U.S. carriers and raising barriers to foreign carrier
entry. Lack of entry and maintenance of the status
quo for the larger U.S. international carriers effectively delayed the benefits of competition for
U.S. consumers. On the other hand, the Commission did embrace competition in the entry standards created in the Foreign ParticipationOrder and
the deregulation of the international settlements
policy. Cost disclosures and increased entry into
the market by providers with less regulatory oversight increase the competitiveness of all carriers in
the market, resulting in increased choices and
lower prices for the U.S. consumer.
The Commission has also moved to a more reasonable regulatory position in considering its limited resources. The need to release multiple orders for carriers with few, if any, affiliates in
foreign countries delayed the effect of this competitive pressure on the incumbent domestic carriers. Global 214 licenses increased applications
on streamlined review and the refusal to automatically remove an application from streamline review exclusively due to an objection by a competing carrier further reduced the time of obtaining
200
authorization for foreign-affiliated carriers.
In its Year 2000 biennial review, the Commission can do more to embrace the pro-U.S. consumer model of open competition in the international telecommunications market. The domestic
interexchange and CMRS markets are examples
of low barriers to entry and vigorous competition
200
See Streamlining Order, 11 FCC Rcd. at 12886, para. 3;
See Licensing Reform Order, 14 FCC Rcd. at 4912-13, para. 8.
201
47 U.S.C. § 161(2) (1994 & Supp. 11 1996) ("[The
Commission] shall determine whether any such regulation is
no longer necessary in the public interest as the result of
meaningful economic competition between providers of
such service.").
202
See Foreign Participation Order, 12 FCC Rcd. at 23913,

para. 50.

203
See ISP Reform NPRM, 13 FCC Rcd. at 15326-27, para.
15. Both countries use a competition authority to monitor

benefiting the U.S. consumer. The following issues, examined under the criteria established in
section 11(a) (2) of the 1996 Act, 20 1 should be
considered in the upcoming 2000 review.
A. Abandon the Effective Competitive
Opportunities Test for all International
Services Applications.
ECO no longer necessarily serves the public interest because the international services market
has become competitive, even on non-WTO member nation routes. The Commission should extend the open-entry criteria it currently provides
applicants from WTO member nations to applicants from all nations. The rebuttable presumption that entry will benefit the market,20 2 can be

conditioned or-in very unusual circumstancesdenied if the licensee engages in conduct that violates the Commission's rules. Rather than erecting barriers to entry and competition, the Commission should adopt the role of marketplace
protector, similar to that of the telecommunica20 3
tions authorities in Australia and New Zealand.
Internet telephony, refile, reorigination of traffic
and other non-traditional means of exchanging
international traffic have changed the marketplace and the necessary regulatory protections.
Open-entry will allow more carriers into the U.S.
market, compounding the competitive effect of
these alternative routing arrangements. Foreign
market entry for U.S. carriers will be achieved
more rapidly through the exercise of multilateral
and bilateral negotiating power, such as the WTO,
rather than through erection of regulatory barriers in this country.
B.

Amend the Commission's Affiliation
Standard.
The Commission's rules contain several differ-

ent definitions of "affiliate" or "affiliation."2 0

4

For

their telecommunications markets. See id. This replaces prophylactic regulations with a competitiveness system that will
not interfere with the marketplace to the same extent. See id.
204
For example, the Commission sets the affiliate standard at control for purposes of protecting consumer information from being used in violation of its CPNI rules. See generally In re Telecommunications Carriers' Use of Customer
Proprietary Network Information and Other Customer Information, Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13
FCC Rcd. 8061 (1998). In its attempt to prevent affiliates of
Foreign Signatories from using their rights as signatories in
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international regulatory purposes, affiliation is a
twenty-five percent equity interest or a controlling
interest at any level. This affiliation standard is no
longer necessary to serve the public interest. The
competitive pressures preclude any foreseeable attempt to engage in the anticompetitive behavior
the Commission seeks to prevent. Instead, the
Commission should rely on a fifty-percent control
standard, which may include a plurality ownership
level in the carrier.
To effectuate a price squeeze or other anticompetitive behavior, the U.S. carrier and foreign-affiliated carriers would have to engage in an illegal,
high-risk operation of providing service below
cost for an extended period of time until other
market participants exit the market. It is purely
theoretical and highly unlikely that a non-controlling minority interest could convince the controlling interest to engage in such activity and succeed to the point where it would effectuate the
harm the Commission is seeking to prevent. The
Commission should recognize the improbability
of such behavior in this market and apply ECO or
its dominant carrier safeguards only when the applicant is controlling or is controlled by the foreign carrier in the destination market.
Further, the Commission should recognize the
inability of a U.S. carrier to force a change in the
affiliate's settlement rates unless it has defacto control over the foreign carrier. U.S. carriers that are
"affiliated" with a foreign carrier under the Commission's current rules, but do not have a level of
interest in the foreign carrier to exercise control
of its operations, have their own facilities authorizations conditioned on the foreign carrier's compliance with the benchmark settlement rates. This
condition could unfairly preclude the U.S. carrier
from the facilities market on this route due to the
actions of a foreign carrier that the U.S. carrier
an anticompetitive manner when receiving direct access to
INTELSAT, the Commission uses a fifty percent standard. See
In re Direct Access to the INTELSAT System, Report and Order,
14 FCC Rcd. 15703 (1999).See also supra note 47 for a discussion of the Commission's change in affiliation standards.
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potentially could not influence or direct due to its
non-controlling interest.
C.

Modify the Benchmark Settlement Rates to
Recognize Calling Party Pays.

In many foreign nations, mobile traffic costs are
the responsibility of the party that originated the
call, not always the mobile user as in the United
States. Many believe this system stimulates growth
and the use of wireless services, and the Commission commenced a proceeding to determine if it
205
would be appropriate in the United States.
Calling Party Pays ("CPP") is currently impacting
the settlement arrangements of U.S. international
carriers that are complying with the Benchmarks
Order. Because CPP costs are the responsibility of
the caller in the originating country, they result in
a hidden surcharge on settlement rates paid for
international service. These surcharges are added
to the present settlement rates and can result in
some cases in rates that exceed the applicable
benchmark. This is a particular concern for U.S.
carriers that are affiliated on the route and providing service on a facilities basis.
D.

Eliminate Any Remaining Cost Disclosures.

All remaining requirements to disclose costs or
make cost information publicly available are no
longer in the public interest as the result of meaningful competition between service providers. In
the ISP Reform Order, the Commission correctly
recognized that the disclosure of cost information
by regulatory mandate can harm competition.
The Commission should extend this conclusion
to other carrier-to-carrier contracts the Commission currently requires to be filed and made avail2 °6
able to interested parties.
205
See generally In re Calling Party Pays Service Offering in
the Commercial Mobile Radio Services, Declaratory Ruling and

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 14 FCC Rcd. 10861 (1999).
206
See 47 C.F.R. § 43.51 (1998).

